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Witnesses-Privileged Communications-PhysicianPatient Privilege in Workmen's Compensation Cases*
In general, persons are required to testify and disclose any information they possess which is germane to the issues in a trial.'
Certain communications, however, are recognized for policy reasons
as being privileged and therefore exceptions to the general disclosure
rule.2 Most of these exceptions have arisen by enactment of specific
statutes since the common law recognized the existence of privileged
communications only in the "cases of counsel, solicitor, and attor'3
ney.
One of these exceptions covers communications between a physician and his patient.4 Some jurisdictions have allowed the physicianpatient privilege to be invoked regardless of the nature of the judicial proceeding. Such a general application is designated a "general
* N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-1-12(d) (1953).
1. United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331-32 (1950). The Court quoted with
approval Dean Wigmore's statement of the proposition:
For more than three centuries it has now been recognized as a fundamental
maxim that the public (in the words sanctioned by Lord Hardwicke) has a
right to every man's evidence. When we come to examine the various claims
of exemption, we start with the primary assumption that there is a general
duty to give what testimony one is capable of giving, and that any exemptions
which may exist are distinctly exceptional, being so many derogations from a
positive general rule.
This statement appears in 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2192 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961).
2. United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331-32 (1950):
Certain exemptions [for witnesses] from attending or, having attended, giving
testimony are recognized by all courts. But every such exemption is grounded
in a substantial individual interest which has been found, through centuries
of experience, to outweigh the public interest in the search for truth.
Professor Wigmore posits four fundamental conditions which must all exist in order to
justify a recognition of privilege against disclosure:
(1) The communication must originate in a confidence that they will not be
disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought
to be sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct
disposal of litigation.
8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2285 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961).
3. Wilson v. Rastall, 4 Term. R. 753, 759, 100 Eng. Rep. 1283, 1287 (1792).
4. E.g., First Trust Co. of St. Paul v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 79 F.2d 48, 52
(8th Cir. 1935).
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physician-patient privilege," and is presently recognized in various
forms and degrees by two-thirds of the jurisdictions of the United
States.' It is often justified as being necessary to encourage people
to present themselves for medical treatment.6
The purpose of the statute . . . is to facilitate and make safe full and
confidential disclosure by patient to physician of all facts, circumstances, and symptoms, untrammeled by apprehension of their subsequent enforced disclosure and publication on the witness stand, to
the end that the physician may form a correct
opinion, and be enabled
7
safely and efficaciously to treat his patient.
It is sometimes suggested that requiring the doctor to testify places
him in conflict with his Hippocratic Oath requirement of secrecy
and might cause him to perjure himself.8 It is argued also that "company doctors" often examine and treat injured employees immediately after an accident and may unfairly obtain information to defeat a potential claim for damages. 9
None of these arguments are particularly persuasive and none of
them satisfy Wigmore's fundamental conditions for recognition of
a privilege.' The injury to society from those few persons who
would not submit themselves for treatment would not likely be as
great as the benefit gained from the just disposal of litigation.
Maintenance of a confidence to the point of perjury is not a relationship which ought to be sedulously fostered. An injured employee
being examined by the "company doctor" does not expect the examination results to be kept confidential. In addition to these specific
arguments which tend to refute the necessity for the privilege, "The
trend in American jurisprudence is toward greater admissibility of
evidence consonant with the need to safeguard the rights of the
5. 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2380 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961).
6. E.g., In re Bruendl's Will, 102 Wis. 45, 78 N.W. 169 (1899).
7. Id. But see Chafee, Privileged Communications: Is Justice Served or Obstructed
by Closing the Doctor's Mouth on the Witness Stand?, 52 Yale L.J. 607, 609 (1943). In
criticising the privilege between doctor and patient, Chafee suggests:
[M]edical treatment is so valuable that few would lose it to prevent facts
from coming to light in court ....
Not a single New England state allows
the doctor to keep silent on the witness stand. Is there evidence that any ill
or injured person in New England has ever stayed from a doctor's office on
that account?
8. Id. at 610.
9. Id. at 610-11.
10. See note 2 supra.
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opposite party."" In accordance with this trend and with arguments
which refute justifications for the "general physician-patient privilege," many articles critical of the privilege have been written. 2
Even in states having a "general physician-patient privilege," it is
denied almost unanimously in certain matters. An example of this is
workmen's compensation law. 13 In New Mexico, however, the privileged communications statute extends the physician-patient privilege
to only two specific situations: those concerning workmen's compensation claimants and those concerning venereal or loathsome diseases." The statute allows a workmen's compensation claimant to
exclude the testimony of any doctor or nurse employed by him to
make an examination relating to his claim. The privilege is lost if
the claimant waives it or if the doctor was actually paid by the em11. State v. Schrader, 64 N.M. 100, 103, 324 P.2d 1025, 1026 (1958) ; accord, Williams v. City of Gallup, 421 P.2d 804 (N.M. 1966) (separate opinion of Wood, J., Ct.
App.).
12. Chafee, Privileged Communications: Is Justice Served or Obstructed by Closing
the Doctor's Mouth on the Witness Stand?, 52 Yale L.J. 607 (1943) ; Lipscomb, Privileged Communication Statute-Svord and Shield, 16 Miss. L.J. 181 (1944) ; Long, The
Physician-PatientPrivilege Statutes Obstruct Justice, 25 Ins. Counsel J. 224 (1958) ;
Comment, Physician-PatientPrivilege: A Need to Revise the Arizona Law, 6 Ariz. L.
Rev. 292 (1965).
13. 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2380 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961): "modern industrial accident legislation has invariably repudiated the privilege in that class of inquiries. . . "
14. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-1-12(d) (1953)
A person duly authorized to practice physic or surgery, or a professional or
registered nurse, cannot be examined without the consent of his patient as to
any communication made by his patient with reference to any real or supposed
venereal or loathsome disease or any knowledge concerning such disease obtained by personal examination of such patient; nor shall any doctor or nurse
employed by a workmen's compensation claimant be examined relating to a
workmen's compensation claim without the consent of his patient as to any
communication made by his patient with reference to any physical or supposed
physical disease or injury or any knowledge obtained by personal examination
of such patient except in instances where the doctor has examined or treated
the patient at the expense of the employer, and such payment is consented to
by the patient.
The present form of the statute was passed in 1939, N.M. Laws 1939, ch. 235, § 1. When
enacted, in 1933, the statute created a "general physician-patient privilege." See note 22
infra and accompanying text.
Disclosure of information concerning venereal or loathsome disease is in the best
public health interest, and jurisdictions that allow a "general physician-patient privilege" deny this application of it. 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2220, 2380 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961). New Mexico's recognition of the physician-patient privilege in cases of
venereal and loathome disease is merely one further anomaly of the New Mexico
statute.
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ployer with the claimant's consent. The effect of this statute is mitigated somewhat by the Workmen's Compensation Act which requires claimants to submit to physical examination by the employer's
physician to determine the extent of their disability. 15 Communications to the physician performing that examination are not privileged. It is the purpose of this Comment to suggest that recognition
of privileged communications between physician and patient in workmen's compensation actions is unnecessary and unjustifiable, and that
the applicable statutes should be amended to deny it.
In 1917 New Mexico enacted a Workmen's Compensation Act 16
which required claimants to submit to examination by the employer's
physician for determination of the extent of the claimant's disability.' 7 The wording of that section was similar to the analogous,
present-day statute.' Significantly, however, it specifically stated
that for the purpose of that act any communications between a
workman and any physician attending him in a professional capacity
were not privileged.' 9 This section of the Workmen's Compensation
Act was reenacted without change in 1929.2" In 1933 New Mexico
enacted a statute which recognized privileges for communications
between attorney and client, clergyman and confessor, physician
and patient, and accountant and client. 2' That statute created a
15. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 59-10-20 (Repl. 1960):
Any employer or insurer shall be entitled to have a physical examination
of the claimant by a physician of its choice before or after the filing of a claim
in the district court or before or after an award of compensation in order to
determine the extent of claimant's disability ....
Any physician selected by the employer and paid by the employer who
shall make or be present at an examination of the claimant conducted in
pursuance of this section may be required to testify as to the conduct thereof
the findings made. Communications made by the claimant upon such examination to such physician or physicians shall not be considered privileged.
16. N.M. Laws 1917, ch. 83.
17. N.M. Laws 1917, ch. 83, § 19.
18. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 59-10-20 (Repl. 1960) which is partially set forth in note 15
supra.
19. N.M. Laws 1917, ch. 83, § 19. The statute provided in part:
Any physician having attended any workman in a professional capacity may
be required to testify before the court when it shall direct and any communication made by such workman to such physician at such examination shall not be
considered privileged.
20. N.M. Laws 1929, ch. 113, § 19.
21. N.M. Laws 1933, ch. 33, § 1.
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"general physician-patient privilege" for New Mexico. 2 An amendment to that statute in 1939 made the physician-patient privilege
applicable only in cases of venereal or loathsome disease and workmen's compensation claims.2" The availability of the physicianpatient privilege in New Mexico's workmen's compensation actions,
therefore, has changed from one extreme to the other. Before the
1939 amendment to the "general physician-patient privilege," it was
available "in general" but excluded in workmen's compensation
claims. 24 After the 1939 amendment to the "general physicianpatient privilege" statute, an apparent contradiction existed: the
privileged communications statute recognized the physician-patient
privilege in workmen's compensation actions, 25 but the Workmen's
Compensation Act denied it.26 In 1947 the apparent contradiction
was eliminated by amending the workmen's compensation statute.
After this amendment, the physician-patient privilege was indisputably recognized by statute for workmen's compensation actions.28
The New Mexico Supreme Court has been called on twice to
elaborate upon the physician-patient privilege in a workmen's compensation case. Recently, in Williams v. City of Gallup,29 a claimant
used the privilege to exclude the testimony of a specialist who had
22. N.M. Laws 1933, ch. 33, § 1 (d):
A person duly authorized to practice physic or surgery, or a professional
or registered nurse, cannot be examined without the consent of his patient as
to any communication made by his patient with reference to any physical or
supposed physical disease or any knowledge obtained by personal examination
of such patient.
23. See notes 14 and 22 supra, and accompanying text.
24. Specific exceptions to a general privilege are not uncommon. N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 54-7-44 (Repl. 1962) excludes from privilege any "Information communicated to a
physician in an effort unlawfully to procure a narcotic drug, or unlawfully to procure
the administration of any such drug . . . ." The Election Code excludes from privilege
any transaction concerning contributions collected or made to any candidate, political
committee, or campaign fund, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 3-10-25 (1953).
25. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-1-12(d) (1953). The text of this section is set forth in
note 14 supra.
26. See note 19 supra, and accompanying text.
27. N.M. Laws 1947, ch. 109, § 1 amended the predecessor of N.M. Stat. Ann. § 5910-20 (Repl. 1960) to the form set out in note 15 supra.
28. The applicable statutes have been unchanged since 1947 and their effect is as
explained in notes 14 and 15 supra, and accompanying text.
29. 421 P.2d 804 (N.M. 1966). The claimant in this case suffered a skull fracture
and his condition was diagnosed as post-traumatic epilepsy. He was treated by a local
doctor but was sent to an Albuquerque specialist after he had suffered two seizures.
The Albuquerque doctor, a specialist in neurological surgery, performed a neurological
examination and a lumber puncture on the claimant, and prescribed drugs for him
which apparently cured the affliction.
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treated him. In deciding a question of waiver of the privilege, the
court elaborated upon what "communications" are included in the
physician-patient privilege:
The communications privileged under § 20-1-12(d), N.M.S.A.
1953, includes [sic] information or knowledge obtained by the
physician by observation or examination of the patient or any part of
his body. The privilege also extends to inferences and conclusions
0
drawn from such observation or examination.
Five years earlier in State ex rel. Miller v. Tackett,8 1 the court considered the statute and said that its language was "clear and unambiguous." The New Mexico court also said that:
[W]here the statute specically grants the privilege it is beyond the
powers of the court to direct petitioner to waive the same. The situation differs from that which is present where the court is given
power and authority to do certain acts upon proof
of good cause or
2
other proper showing provided for in the statute.3
The court's interpretation is broad, but justifiable considering the
terms of the statute. The court has passed-up two opportunities to
restrict the operation of the statute, and if change is to occur, it
likely must be legislative.
Many courts hold that one who initiates an action for damages on
an injury waives the physician-patient privilege in matters relating
to that injury. They note that one of the most prevalent justifications for the "general physician-patient privilege" is the necessity to
assure people that their infirmities will not be disclosed by the physician they attend.33 These courts reason that it would be inconsistent
to protect from disclosure medical facts upon which the patient is
30. Id. at 808.
31. 68 N.M. 318, 361 P.2d 724 (1961). A workman's compensation claimant had
been examined by three doctors who had been paid by the employer. The employer
wished to interview a fourth doctor who had examined the claimant at his own request. The claimant refused to permit the interview relying on the privilege of N.M.
Stat. Ann. § 20-1-12(d) (1953). The bill for consultation with the fourth doctor comprised part of the damages sought in the action. The trial court ordered the claimant
to authorize disclosure by the fourth doctor of any information concerning his "physical
condition and treatment." The supreme court, however, sustained the employee's contention that such an order was improper.
32. Id. at 323, 361 P.2d at 727-28.
33. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
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relying in his action for damages.8 4 To allow the privilege to be
claimed in these situations would be ludicrous: the patient is not
concerned with concealing his physical condition. He is, instead,
preventing one of his doctors from divulging the medical facts as he
knows them, while simultaneously requesting another doctor to
publicly disclose his interpretation of those facts. This reasoning
was suggested by counsel in the Miller case, 5 but the court held that
"such assertion cannot be reconciled with the language of § 20-1-12.
. . .,,)6 Rationalization of this strategic advantage for the claimant
seems impossible.
Most jurisdictions which recognize a "general physician-patient
privilege" require existence of a "physician-patient relationship" before the privilege can be claimed. This determination depends upon
whether the physician was administering "treatment" to the patient
or was merely performing
an examination, with no intention of
"treating" the patient.8 7 Payment of the physician's bill is considered
irrelevant.8 8 In New Mexico, however, the statute provides that the
34. E.g., City & County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 227, 231 P.2d
26 (1951). In this case the claimant's attorneys had requested the doctor to perform a
physical examination to aid in preparation of the claim. The court said:
The whole purpose of the privilege is to preclude the humiliation of the
patient that might follow disclosure of his ailments. When the patient himself
discloses those ailments by bringing an action in which they are in issue, there
is no longer any reason for the privilege. The patient-litigant exception precludes one who has placed in issue his physical condition from invoking the
privilege on the ground that disclosure of his condition would cause him
humiliation. He cannot have his cake and eat it too.
Id., 231 P.2d at 28.
35. State ex rel. Miller v. Tackett, 68 N.M. 318, 261 P.2d 724 (1961).
36. Id. at 321, 361 P.2d at 726.
37. E.g., Kramer v. Policy Holders' Life Ins. Ass'n, 5 Cal. App. 2d 380, 42 P.2d
665 (Ct. App. 1935) (attendance of patient at free clinic for examination by a doctor
to test the efficiency of a cancer treatment given by the clinic created physician-patient
relationship) ; Holtzen v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 159 Mo. App. 370, 140 S.W. 767 (1911)
(injured railroad passenger examined by railroad doctor in railroad hospital pursuant
to treatment for his injuries was allowed to claim the privilege) ; Smart v. Kansas City,
208 Mo. 162, 105 S.W. 709 (1907) (patient in defendant's hospital allowed to claim
the privilege excluding testimony of defendant's doctors who had merely donated their
assistance in treatment).
38. Smart v. Kansas City, supra note 37, held that the privilege would exist
whether patient was "poor or paying, in private residence or hospital, or was charity
patient in public hospital." See Battis v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 124 Iowa 623, 100
N.W. 543 (1904), where the defendant railroad called its local surgeon for the sole
purpose of examining an injured passenger to ascertain his condition for the railroad's
benefit should a claim subsequently arise. The surgeon, however, attended to the
passenger by dressing a small wound. The court held that the passenger could claim
privilege upon this relationship.
[I]t [the railroad company] may send a physician to inspect and take notes, or
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employee-patient's acquiescence in payment of the physician by the
employer is determinative of his right to claim the privilege.3 9
A study of the purposes of workmen's compensation legislation
will demonstrate that those purposes are not furthered by the physician-patient privilege. In an early New Mexico case, Gonzales v.
Chino Copper Co., 40 Judge Sam G. Bratton, in the syllabus by the
court, outlined the policy of workmen's compensation in this state.
The theory upon which the Workmen's Compensation Acts of the
several states have been adopted was to substantiate a more humanitarian and economical system of compensation for injured workmen
or their dependents in case of death; to provide a speedy and inex-

pensive method by which such compensation might be made, which
is more in harmony with modern methods of industry than the common-law liability for torts, which usually involved long, tedious, and
expensive litigation. In addition, it was thought the industry to which
the employee contributed his labor should bear the expense of such

economic burdens which become a legitimate part of the commercial
life and is borne by the consuming public because the cost thereof is
added to the cost of the article, and, in the final analysis, is borne by
the community at large.

In Sanchez v. Hill Lines, Inc. 41 the United States Federal District
Court for New Mexico quoted with approval a United States Supreme Court opinion that dealt with workmen's compensation laws
of Vermont and New Hampshire :42 "[T] he purpose of . . . workmen's compensation laws . . . is to provide . . . not only for employees a remedy which is both expeditious and independent of proof
of fault, but also for employers a liability which is limited and determinate. '4 3 The rights typically provided by workmen's compensation
legislation allow wage benefits and medical expenses for accidental injuries arising out of and sustained by an employee in the course of
otherwise inform himself of existing conditions. But this can avail the company nothing unless the physician shall strictly retain his character as an
employ6 of the company. If, upon request or upon his own motion, he assumes
to advise or administer treatment to the patient, and the latter in any manner
acquiesces therein, the physician thereby casts aside his relation as an employi
of the company, and transfers his allegiance to the patient. . . . It matters not,
in this connection, who calls him in the first instance, or who pays him.
39. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-1-12(d) (1953). The section is set forth in note 14 rupra.
40. 29 N.M. 228, 222 P. 903 (1924).
41. 123 F. Supp. 42 (D.N.M. 1954).
42. Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
43. Sanchez v. Hill Lines, Inc., 123 F. Supp. 42, 44 (D.N.M. 1954).
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his employment. Awards are not large enough to encourage
malingering, but they are almost certain because liability is not based
upon a determination of fault.4 4 The New Mexico Workmen's
Compensation Act does not coincide exactly with "typical" acts,45
but in many respects it is similar.48
Fair and just application of these rights to spread the risk of a
workman's injury and have it borne by the community at large demands that full disclosure be made of all relevant facts at the trial.
44. A concise statement of the typical features of a workmen's compensation act is
given in A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation § 1.10 (1965). Larson says:
(a) the basic operating principle is that an employee is automatically entitled
to certain benefits whenever he suffers a "personal injury by accident arising
out of and in the course of employment"; (b) negligence and fault are largely
immaterial, both in the sense that the employee's contributory negligence does
not lessen his rights and in the sense that the employer's complete freedom from
fault does not lessen his liability; (c) coverage is limited to persons having the
status of employee, as distinguished from independent contractor; (d) benefits
to the employee include cash-wage benefits, usually around one-half to twothirds of his average weekly wage, and hospital and medical expenses; in
death cases benefits for dependents are provided; arbitrary maximum and
minimum limits are ordinarily imposed; (e) the employee and his dependents
in exchange for these modest but assured benefits, give up their common law
right to sue the employer for damages for any injury covered by the act; (f)
the right to sue third persons whose negligence caused the injury remains,
however, with the proceeds usually being applied first to reimbursement of the
employer for the compensation outlay, the balance (or most of it) going to the
employee; (g) administration is typically in the hands of administrative commissions; and as far as possible, rules of procedure, evidence, and conflict of
laws are relaxed to facilitate the achievement of the beneficent purposes of
the legislation; and (h) the employer is required to secure his liability through
private insurance, state-fund insurance in some states, or "self-insurance";
thus the burden of compensation liability does not remain upon the employer
but passes to the consumer, since compensation premiums, as part of the cost
of production, will be reflected in the price of the product.
45. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 59-10-13.7,-13.10 (Repl. 1960) require any claim for recovery
of workmen's compensation benefits to be filed and tried in district court in the same
manner as a civil complaint. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 59-10-7, -8 (Repl. 1960) retain some
elements of fault determination before imposition of liability by allowing reduction of
benefits if the workman failed to use a provided safety device; by allowing increase
of benefits if the employer failed to provide a safety device; and by disallowing any
benefits if the workman's injury was caused by his intoxication.
46. Wright v. Schultz, 55 N.M. 261, 265, 231 P.2d 937, 939 (1951) : "Contributory
negligence has no place in our Workmen's Compensation Act, unless it be in failure of
the workman to observe a statutory safety regulation . . . in which event a claimant
suffers a reduction . . . in the compensation he would otherwise receive." McKinney
v. Dorlac, 48 N.M. 149, 152, 146 P.2d 867, 869 (1944) : "A liberal construction of the
Workmen's Compensation Act has been adopted by this court. The theory of the legislation is compensation, not the denial of it." Cuellar v. American Employers' Ins. Co.,
36 N.M. 141, 143, 9 P.2d 685, 686 (1932): "The idea of negligence as an essential to
recovery is generally foreign to the theory of workmen's compensation."
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Liability of employers who are free from fault can be justified, but
procedures should not be imposed to hinder accurate determination
of the legitimacy of a claim. Numerous situations may be imagined
in which the employer's position would be unnecessarily prejudiced
if he were not allowed to examine all doctors who have treated the
claimant.
Hypothetically, an employee might have injured his back in nonwork activity and discovered that it was serious after disclosure to
and treatment by his personal doctor. If he then can feign that the
injury occurred on the job, he can satisfy his medical burden of
proof for workmen's compensation by consulting a different doctor
for verification that an injury does exist without disclosing the
cause. 47 The employer's only practical defense in this situationtestimony of claimant's first doctor-may be pre-empted by the
claimant. In some cases the employer, by additional medical examination of the claimant, may be able to show that the cause of the
injury was not job-related. This type of proof will, however, be
problematical at best and expensive.
A different inequitable situation for the employer can occur when
the claimant is treated by one doctor who sends him to another
doctor, possibly a specialist, for further treatment. The second
doctor may treat and cure the ailment; he may realize, contrary to
the first doctor, that it was not job-related. He might even realize
that the ailment is congenital. The claimant need not rely on the
second doctor, however, to make out his workmen's compensation
claim; and furthermore by use of the privileged communications
statute the claimant can prevent the second doctor from disclosing
47. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 59-10-13.3 (Repl. 1960) sets forth the proof required for
compensable claims:
A. Claims for workmen's compensation shall be allowed only:
(1) when the workman has sustained an accidental injury arising out of,
and in the course of his employment;
(2) when the accident was reasonably incident to his employment; and
(3) when the disability is a natural and direct result of the accident.
B. In all cases where the defendants deny that an alleged disability is a
natural and direct result of the accident, the workman must establish that
causal connection as a medical probability by expert medical testimony. No
award of compensation shall be based on speculation or on expert testimony
that as a medical possibility the causal connection exists.
This burden of proof requirement, however, was elaborated in Clower v. Grossman, 55
N.M. 546, 549, 237 P.2d 353, 354 (1951) :
[I]t is not necessary that the proof [that the employee sustained an accidental
injury in the course of and arising out of his employment] . . . be direct, but
may be shown by circumstantial evidence alone.
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facts that would jeopardize his claim. New Mexico law makes such
artifice a legitimate tactic.
The employer can require the claimant to submit to a medical
examination by another doctor ;4s but when there has been treatment,
possibly cure, and there is an uncooperative patient, the subsequent
medical examination may not unearth the information necessary to
defend against a fraudulent claim.
The inequitable situations described above arise only when the
claimant has consulted two or more doctors, but in the present age
of medical specialization this commonly occurs. A bona fide claim
for workmen's compensation should not require exclusion of the
testimony of any doctor who has treated the claimant.
The "general physician-patient privilege" is subject to many
criticisms. In workmen's compensation law, the privilege is even
more questionable because a claimant can take unjust advantage of
it. Although awards of compensation for loss of earning capacity
are not lucrative,4 9 the payment of medical and related benefits
pursuant to the injury may amount to 30,000 dollars during the
five-year period following it.50 Those awards can provide adequate
incentive for presentation of false claims. The "beneficent purposes
of the legislation"" are not furthered by preserving an evidentiary
device which hinders determination of a claim's legitimacy. The
provisions for the physician-patient privilege should be amended to
exclude it in workmen's compensation cases.
PATRICK W.

HURLEY

48. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 59-10-20 (Repl. 1960), set forth partially in note 15 supra.
49. E.g., Ch. 151, § 2, [1967] N.M. Laws 1st Sess. which amended N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 59-10-18.4 (Supp. 1965). Maximum compensation benefits for injuries to "specific body
members" are set at sixty % of the claimant's average weekly earnings, but they are
not to exceed forty-five dollars per week for specified maximum periods.
50. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 59-10-19.1 (Supp. 1965).
51. A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation § 1.10(g) (1965).

